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Abstract
Background Recent changes to the regulatory landscape of
pharmaceuticals may sometimes require reimbursement
authorities to issue guidance on technologies that have a
less mature evidence base. Decision makers need to be
aware of risks associated with such health technology
assessment (HTA) decisions and the potential to manage
this risk through managed entry agreements (MEAs).
Objective This work develops methods for quantifying risk
associated with specific MEAs and for clearly communi-
cating this to decision makers.
Methods We develop the ‘HTA risk analysis chart’, in which
we present the payer strategy and uncertainty burden (P-SUB)
as a measure of overall risk. The P-SUB consists of the payer
uncertainty burden (PUB), the risk stemming from decision
uncertainty as to which is the truly optimal technology from
the relevant set of technologies, and the payer strategy burden
(PSB), the additional risk of approving a technology that is not
expected to be optimal. We demonstrate the approach using
three recent technology appraisals from the UK National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), each of
which considered a price-based MEA.
Results The HTA risk analysis chart was calculated using
results from standard probabilistic sensitivity analyses. In
all three HTAs, the new interventions were associated with
substantial risk as measured by the P-SUB. For one of these
technologies, the P-SUB was reduced to zero with the
proposed price reduction, making this intervention cost
effective with near complete certainty. For the other two,
the risk reduced substantially with a much reduced PSB
and a slightly increased PUB.
Conclusions The HTA risk analysis chart shows the risk that
the healthcare payer incurs under unresolved decision uncer-
tainty and when considering recommending a technology that
is not expected to be optimal given current evidence. This
allows the simultaneous consideration of financial and data-
collectionMEA schemes in an easily understood format. The
use of HTA risk analysis charts will help to ensure that MEAs
are considered within a standard utility-maximising health
economic decision-making framework.
Key Points for the Decision Maker
The health technology assessment (HTA) risk
analysis chart presents a standardised visualisation to
show the need for and potential value of different
classes of managed entry agreement (MEA)
schemes.
Its use in HTA could ensure that MEAs are
considered routinely, consistently and transparently.
The HTA risk analysis chart allows for simultaneous
consideration of financial and data-collection MEA
schemes.
1 Introduction
Recent changes to the regulatory landscape of pharma-
ceuticals, such as adaptive pathways or conditional
licensing schemes [1, 2] issued by the European Medicines
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Agency, allow licensing of new health technologies more
quickly, or with a restriction to a certain population. These
changes result in decision-making bodies being required to
issue guidance on technologies that have a smaller evi-
dence base than previously, causing greater uncertainty
regarding the clinical and cost effectiveness of new tech-
nologies at the point of decision making. With this comes
an increased risk of making the ‘wrong’ decision that
affects the healthcare system and ultimately health in the
population served.
Schemes that allow the development of further evidence
or that entail a risk-sharing component can be employed to
mitigate this risk. These schemes, called managed entry
agreements (MEAs) [3], are agreements between manufac-
turers and decision-making bodies designed to reduce the
risk incurred by health services. The two broad conditions
set out in MEAs are (1) that the price of the technology be
reduced through a range of different financial schemes and/
or (2) that further data will be collected [3, 4]. Both con-
ditions aim to reduce the risk associated with a recom-
mendation and include a range of specific types of schemes
that are described in detail in the literature [3–7]. A recent
review of MEAs, or performance-based risk-sharing
schemes, showed that companies are often willing to share
risk in schemes that entail coverage with evidence devel-
opment, price reductions or performance-linked reimburse-
ment, conditional treatment continuation, and financial or
utilisation caps as well as in multi-component schemes [8].
The review furthermore found that the use of such schemes
is increasing globally [8]. However, the exact conditions can
vary widely in terms of their duration, populations in which
they are employed, stopping rules and other features [8].
Health technology assessment (HTA) decision making
follows the principle that when a new technology is esti-
mated to be cost ineffective, its recommendation is not
warranted at the given price. However, in practice, decision
makers are faced with decisions under uncertainty and a
range of plausible incremental cost-effectiveness ratios
(ICERs) that often span cost-effectiveness thresholds.
Whilst evidence collection-based MEAs will reduce
uncertainty and produce revised estimates of costs and
benefits after data are collected, this does not alter the
calculation of expected net benefit of the appraised tech-
nologies at present, that is before the evidence has been
collected. Similarly, a financial MEA scheme will not
directly address the scale of uncertainty in costs or benefits.
However, price reductions can and do affect decision
uncertainty by making a technology more (or less) likely to
be cost effective given current evidence. There is therefore
value in an analysis that considers either a price reduction
or a research-based MEA scheme, and indeed one that can
consider schemes that incorporate both reducing uncer-
tainty and price simultaneously.
The existing health economic literature provides meth-
ods for assessing research schemes [4, 9–13]. Furthermore,
the requirements that have to be in place for ‘only in
research’ or ‘recommendation with research’ (RwR)
schemes, and the principles and assessment methods for
such schemes, have been discussed in detail by Claxton
et al. [12], McKenna et al. [9] and Rothery et al. [5]. These
papers are particularly useful in deciding whether more
research could and should be conducted, and in which
sequence different assessments should be performed.
However, these papers do not provide a method for quan-
tifying and presenting risks that are typically encountered
at the time of decision making. Since the above-mentioned
trend of an increasing number of company submissions
with an immature evidence base may result in decision
makers demanding more research in many cases, we con-
sider it important to have a unified approach for simulta-
neously considering the need for price and research MEA
schemes in the HTA process and to be able to present the
results of such risk analyses to analysts and decision
makers in an accessible and comprehensible manner.
This paper describes and presents a visual aid for deci-
sion making that enables the simultaneous consideration of
financial and research schemes—the HTA risk analysis
chart. This builds upon existing methods referenced above
and enables consistent and transparent consideration of the
potential need for MEA schemes in the HTA process. The
paper is structured as follows: in the Methods section, we
introduce the key concepts of the ‘payer strategy and
uncertainty burden’ (P-SUB) to assess the need for an
MEA, we develop the HTA risk analysis chart and describe
three past UK National Institute for Health and Care
Excellence (NICE) technology appraisals in which we
applied it; in the Results section, we present the HTA risk
analysis chart applied to the three case studies, discuss the
potential need for an MEA in each of these appraisals and
present the change in the HTA risk analysis charts after an
MEA scheme is put in place; we end with a discussion and
conclusion.
2 Methods
2.1 The Payer Strategy and Uncertainty Burden
as a measure of risk in Health Technology
Assessments
We consider two types of risk burden linked with a deci-
sion on whether to recommend the introduction of a new
health technology in a health system. The first is the risk
burden that arises due to decision uncertainty and is a
characteristic that applies to all the technologies or strate-
gies that are compared in the overall decision problem. The
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second is the strategy-specific risk burden associated with
choosing a specific non-optimal strategy from the set of
technologies available.
Our context is a decision problem with at least two
technologies compared, where the decision analyst calcu-
lates the expected costs and benefits of each technology
given current evidence and proposed prices, accounting for
uncertainty. The decision maker then determines which of
the technologies should be considered ‘optimal’. The most
optimal strategy is that with the greatest expected ‘payoff’
as measured by expected net benefit. The first risk that we
consider is based on decision uncertainty and can be more
intuitively described as the risk that the health technology
that appears optimal based on current evidence and prices
might, in fact, not be the truly optimal strategy. This may
be caused by uncertainty in cost-effectiveness model
parameters due to imperfect current evidence.
The second risk we consider is that associated with
adopting a ‘non-optimal’ technology, i.e. one that appears,
given current evidence and current proposed prices, to be
less cost effective than the optimal technology. As this
‘optimality’ is measured by expected net benefit, this
concept simply refers to the risk of adopting a technology
that does not have the highest expected net benefit. Gen-
erally, a decision maker would recommend the most cost-
effective strategy (based on decision theory) unless risk
neutrality is violated. This second risk therefore answers
the what-if question: ‘‘What if a ‘non-optimal’ technology
were recommended—how much loss or burden would that
incur (again using the expected net benefit measure)?’’.
This may be important when the decision maker does not
recommend the optimal technology, because of a deviation
from risk neutrality. A rational decision maker, if risk
neutral, and under the assumption that any decision is
reversible at no cost, should always select the decision
option with the highest expected net benefit. They should
never select an option with a positive payer strategy burden
(PSB). However, when faced with highly uncertain deci-
sions, decision makers (who are not necessarily risk neu-
tral) may be inclined to consider recommending
technologies expected to be cost ineffective, under the
condition that further research is undertaken. This second
risk measure is therefore important, and it is strategy
specific—for the strategy that is expected to be optimal, the
value of this risk burden is zero, but for each ‘non-optimal’
strategy, the value of this risk burden will be positive.
We propose quantifying and visualising the first risk, i.e.
the measure of the overall risk burden associated with all
possible decisions, by using the payer uncertainty burden
(PUB). The PUB describes the expected cost of decision
uncertainty, which is related to the probability of making
the ‘wrong’ decision based on current evidence, and the
cost associated with that ‘wrong’ decision. The PUB is
equivalent to the expected value of perfect information
(EVPI), or the expected opportunity loss [14], and can be
interpreted as the value of eliminating all uncertainty and
hence the possibility of making the wrong decision [15].
The calculation of the PUB, or the EVPI, is based upon
results from the probabilistic sensitivity analysis (PSA),
and was intuitively described by Wilson [16]. Our rationale
for introducing the new term ‘payer uncertainty burden’ for
EVPI was to make it absolutely clear that it is not only the
uncertainty itself that is quantified but also the conse-
quences of this uncertainty, which pose a burden to the
payer, compared with a scenario in which there is no
uncertainty. Whilst we do not wish to replace the term
EVPI, we do wish to spark a change in thinking to reflect
that the PUB is not only the value of research but a risk
burden to the decision maker and payer (originally referred
to as the expected opportunity loss by Raiffa in 1968 [14]),
which can then be addressed through the use of MEAs. The
PUB therefore describes the risk to the payer (on behalf of
society), and, in a health system with a budget constraint,
ultimately the expected risk to patients in terms of societal
health foregone. Mathematically, this can be written as
PUB ¼ EVPI
¼ Eh maxNB d; hð Þ
d
 
max
d
Eh NB d; hð Þf g
 
 0;
ð1Þ
where NB(d; h) is the net benefit function, d indexes
strategies in some set D, and h is a vector of uncertain
model parameters.
We propose quantifying and visualising the second risk,
i.e. the measure of the strategy-specific risk burden, given
current evidence and price, via a second quantity, the payer
strategy burden (PSB). The PSB for each specific strategy
is the difference between the expected net benefit of the
optimal strategy and the expected net benefit of the chosen
strategy. Again, mathematically,
PSB d0ð Þ ¼ max
d
Eh NB d; hð Þf g  Eh NB d0; hð Þf g
 
[ 0;
ð2Þ
where d0 is a strategy that is expected to be cost ineffective
based on current evidence. For the cost-effective strategy
d*, the PSB(d*) equals zero.
If in a hypothetical technology assessment, a technology
expected to be cost ineffective was recommended under
decision uncertainty, the payer would face the combined
risk of the PSB and the PUB. We denote the sum of these
as the P-SUB. Each of these quantities (PUB, PSB, P-SUB)
can be expressed in either monetary units or health output
units (for example, life-years or quality-adjusted life-years
[QALYs]). The P-SUB d0ð Þ is given by,
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PSUB d0ð Þ ¼ PUBþ PSB d0ð Þ
¼ Eh max
d
NB d; hð Þf g
 
 Eh NBðd0; hÞf g
 
:
ð3Þ
Given the size of the population for whom the decision
problem is relevant in a year, the annual population PUB,
PSB or P-SUB can be calculated. This allows the proposed
risk measures to be compared in population-level absolute
terms across decision problems.
2.2 The HTA Risk Analysis Chart
We propose the HTA risk analysis chart as a method for
immediately conveying the P-SUB associated with each
strategy in a decision problem in a single, simple plot. An
example for an illustrative model is shown in Fig. 1. The
blue bars represent the PUB and are the same height for
each intervention because the PUB is the risk relating to
uncertainty associated with the whole decision problem
rather than any specific decision strategy. The overall
EVPI, i.e. the PUB, is £700 per person affected by the
decision, which at a maximum acceptable ICER of £20,000
is equivalent to 0.035 QALYs worth of decision uncer-
tainty per person. The PSB is represented by the red bars
stacked on top of the PUB. These are different heights
because they relate to the strategy-specific risk. The cost-
effective intervention (in this figure, intervention 3) has a
PSB of zero. Given current prices and evidence, both
intervention 2 and intervention 3 are less cost effective than
intervention 1, which is indicated by their respective PSBs
of £1000 and £2000 per person. The P-SUBs are shown on
the cost scale on the y axis (£1700 and £2700, respectively)
and on the QALY scale above each bar (0.085 and 0.135
QALYs, respectively). We also present in a text box the
PUB (£7 million) and the largest PSB (£20 million) of the
decision problem accrued over the affected patient popu-
lation per annum. This enables cross comparison between
decision problems in terms of the national scale of risk
involved.
2.3 Using the HTA Risk Analysis Chart to Consider
Managed Entry Agreements
The quantified P-SUB provides information that can help
to inform the need for and potential value of an MEA, as
well as the form of MEA (whether price based and/or
evidence based).
The first step is to examine the risk given current evi-
dence and proposed prices, as for example in our hypo-
thetical example in Fig. 1. If there is a substantial PSB (a
large red component of the bar) for the intervention of
interest, this suggests that a price-based MEA could be
useful. This is because a price reduction in the technology of
interest would decrease the PSB, i.e. decrease the expected
incremental net benefit between the technology of interest
and the technology we currently expect to be most cost
effective. If there is a large PUB (a large blue component to
each bar) due to uncertainty in model parameters based on
current evidence, this suggests a further evidence collection-
based MEA scheme could warrant further investigation [4].
The PUB is equivalent to the EVPI, and an additional step
that can be useful to help design proposed evidence col-
lection-based MEAs is to establish which of the uncertain
parameters is driving decision uncertainty by performing an
expected value of perfect parameter information (EVPPI)
analysis as described elsewhere [17, 18]. Whilst these rules
of thumb are broadly true, it is important to realise that
either type of MEA scheme (price based or evidence based)
has an effect on both the PSB and the PUB, i.e. any MEA
scheme will change the size of both the red and the blue bars
in the HTA risk analysis chart.
The second step is to estimate revised risk analysis
charts by simulating proposed MEA schemes. The analysis
required depends upon the type of MEA scheme proposed.
The process for calculating the revised P-SUB is simpler
for price reductions than for research schemes, although
both follow the same principles. The easiest type of
scheme to analyse is a simple proposed price discount. For
this, the cost-effectiveness model can simply be re-run with
the new price in place and the resulting PSA can be used to
produce the revised HTA risk analysis chart. More com-
plicated price-based MEA schemes exist where price is
contingent upon health outcomes, for example a money-
back guarantee scheme [3], where the payer only pays for
the treatment for those patients who experience a response
above some pre-set threshold. For such price-reduction
schemes, it is necessary to perform another PSA with the
MEA price rule in place.
In contrast to price-reduction schemes, additional steps
are required for assessing evidence-based schemes: (1) the
Fig. 1 Health technology assessment risk analysis chart illustrated in
a hypothetical example. PSB payer strategy burden, PUB payer
uncertainty burden, QALY quality-adjusted life-year
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calculation of EVPPI to obtain an idea of where future
research efforts should be directed; (2) the design of
potential research schemes, for example with different
sample sizes and follow-up; (3) the calculation of the
expected value of sample information (EVSI) of these
schemes; (4) the comparison of the different EVSIs to costs
by subtracting the costs of each scheme from its EVSI to
yield the expected net gain of this research [11]; and (5) the
time that elapses between the decision and the time at
which research becomes available, takes an effect and
translates into a gain in population health. The EVSI
quantifies the expected reduction in uncertainty if we are to
undertake a specific data-collection exercise as part of an
MEA scheme, for example a new randomised controlled
trial (RCT) or a post-marketing observational study
[10, 13, 19]. It turns out, mathematically, that the reduction
in the PUB per person due to a proposed evidence-based
scheme is exactly the EVSI, so it is simple to calculate the
revised risk analysis chart once the EVSI calculation has
been undertaken. The mathematics of this [6] and the
methods to calculate EVSI, including fast estimation of
EVSI using the SAVI online tool, are described in further
detail elsewhere [6, 10, 13]. It may be of interest to note
that calculation of EVPPI or EVSI can only give an indi-
cation of the expected with-research P-SUB, but once the
data have been collected, the PUB can be recalculated
based on the new evidence. The new PUB will have
reduced, assuming the study was designed to address the
present uncertainties and was well designed and executed.
The PSB may also have changed, for instance if the
research finds that the new technology is more or less
effective than previously thought.
We define the revised P-SUB as that which remains
when an MEA is adopted. The overall value of any pro-
posed MEA design can be assessed in terms of its reduction
in the P-SUB, i.e. the original P-SUB given current evi-
dence and proposed prices minus the revised P-SUB with
the MEA scheme in place. When assessing MEA schemes
that take effect only at future time points (most research
schemes), it is also desirable to present the P-SUB over the
expected technology relevance horizon. The P-SUB should
then be calculated for each time period, with and without
the use of an MEA scheme, to compare the lifetime value
of that MEA scheme with the counterfactual. Further detail
on this can be found in Grimm et al. [6].
2.4 Application of the HTA Risk Analysis
Chart in Three Technology Appraisals
from the UK National Institute for Health
and Care Excellence
We illustrate the HTA risk analysis chart using three
existing technology appraisals conducted by NICE. Each
case involved decision uncertainty and a financial MEA
proposal. We had access to the cost-effectiveness models
for each of the three appraisals and were therefore able to
calculate the P-SUB with and without the financial MEA in
place.
2.4.1 Study 1
In 2010, NICE appraised trabectedin versus best supportive
care for the treatment of advanced soft tissue sarcoma [20].
Trabectedin was recommended in patients for whom
treatment with anthracyclines and ifosfamide had failed or
in patients who were intolerant of or had contraindications
for treatment with anthracyclines and ifosfamide under the
conditions of a financial MEA. This MEA entailed that the
acquisition cost of trabectedin for treatment needed after
the fifth cycle be met by the manufacturer. Trabectedin was
considered to fulfil end-of-life criteria, i.e. to extend life by
more than 3 months for patients with a life expectancy
shorter than 24 months [21]. To reflect the additional value
placed on such end-of-life technologies in the UK, the
maximum acceptable ICER used in the present analysis
was £50,000 per QALY gained. To reflect this proposed
MEA scheme, the model was adjusted to incorporate the
‘no reimbursement for more than five treatment cycles’
rule.
2.4.2 Study 2
In 2012, NICE appraised dasatinib and nilotinib versus
interferon-a for the treatment of imatinib-resistant chronic
myeloid leukaemia (CML) [22], amongst other treatments
and indications that, for the sake of simplicity, are not
presented here. The manufacturers of nilotinib and dasa-
tinib had agreed to patient access schemes that entailed
straight discounts on the list price. NICE recommended
nilotinib but did not recommend dasatinib. The maximum
acceptable ICER used in the present analysis was £20,000
and £30,000 per QALY gained. To adjust the PSA to
reflect the proposed MEA schemes, we used the discounted
price instead of the list price.
2.4.3 Study 3
In 2014, NICE appraised lenalidomide versus best sup-
portive care for the treatment of myelodysplastic syn-
dromes [23]. It was recommended as an option for people
with transfusion-dependent anaemia caused by low- or
intermediate-risk myelodysplastic syndromes associated
with an isolated deletion 5q cytogenetic abnormality when
other treatments have failed to achieve a full response.
Approval was conditional on a financial MEA scheme. The
MEA scheme was a utilisation cap scheme by which the
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manufacturer would not be reimbursed for more than 26
treatment cycles per patient. The maximum accept-
able ICER used in the present analysis was £20,000 per
QALY gained. The model was adjusted to reflect this
proposed MEA scheme by capping the cost at a maximum
of 26 treatment cycles.
3 Results
In study 1, trabectedin, when offered at list price, was
associated with an ICER of £52,000 per QALY gained, a
PUB of £1457 and a PSB of £1000 per person (assuming a
£50,000 per QALY threshold). The P-SUB was therefore
£2457 per person, or £2.4 million for the 1000 annually
affected patient population (Fig. 2a). The proposed finan-
cial MEA scheme made trabectedin cost effective (ICER of
£35,000 per QALY gained), i.e. reduced the PSB to zero,
and also eliminated any decision uncertainty, i.e. showing a
PUB of zero and therefore a P-SUB of zero (Fig. 2b). The
elimination of the PUB was not caused by a reduction in
uncertainty in the cost or benefit parameters. Instead, the
price scheme eliminated decision uncertainty by moving
the ICER away from the threshold. The risk reduction
achieved due to the MEA as measured by the change in
P-SUB at a population level was therefore around £2.4
million. With a P-SUB of zero, no further MEA schemes
were required.
Without the MEA, dasatinib and nilotinib in study 2 had
ICERs of approximately £25,000 per QALY gained com-
pared with interferon-a, and both were associated with a
large PSB (assuming a threshold of £20,000 per QALY
gained) of £24,300 and £17,200 per person, respectively
(Fig. 2c). With 200 people affected annually in the popu-
lation, these are equivalent to £4.86 million and £3.44
million. The PUB was only £8 per person, reflecting small
uncertainty about these interventions being cost ineffective
when compared with interferon-a. The proposed MEAs for
nilotinib and dasatinib resulted in only a small change in
the ICERs and only marginally changed the HTA risk
analysis chart. However, when a threshold of £30,000 per
QALY gained was considered, nilotinib had a PSB of zero,
but this also resulted in an increase in decision uncertainty,
reflected in a post-MEA PUB of £1500 per person
(Fig. 2d). The MEA scheme for dasatinib reduced its PSB
to £5500 per person. Further price reductions through
financial schemes would be needed to eliminate the PSB
for dasatinib. The PUB accrued over the population was
not large, at £0.3 million, making it unlikely though not
impossible that further research could have a positive
expected net benefit. For nilotinib, the risk reduction
achieved due to the MEA as measured by the change in
P-SUB at a population level was around £3.1 million,
whereas that for dasatinib was around £3.46 million.
In study 3 and without the MEA, lenalidomide was cost
ineffective (ICER of £70,000 per QALY gained, and a
threshold of £20,000 per QALY gained was assumed)
compared with best supportive care. The PSB was large at
just under £35,000 per person and the PUB was zero,
reflecting that there was no uncertainty about lenalidomide
being cost ineffective (Fig. 2e). The large per person PSB
also translated into a large impact accrued over the affected
patient population, as the payer would incur a PSB of
almost £250 million, which would translate into approxi-
mately 12,500 QALYs foregone. With the MEA,
lenalidomide remained cost ineffective (ICER of £25,000
per QALY gained), but the PSB was substantially reduced
to £4700 per person (Fig. 2f), or £26 million when accrued
over the affected population. The MEA did also introduce
some decision uncertainty, reflected in a PUB of £1100 per
person, or £8.5 million accrued over the affected popula-
tion. Therefore, for lenalidomide, the risk reduction
achieved due to the MEA as measured by the change in
P-SUB at a population level was around £215 million. The
magnitude of the residual P-SUB (£34.5 million) indicates
that there would still be potential value in further research
or financial MEAs.
Comparison across the three technology appraisals is
facilitated by the HTA risk analysis chart. It is easy to see,
visually and with the summary measures, that the risk prior
to the proposed MEA is substantially larger in the
lenalidomide (Fig. 2e) than in the trabectedin appraisal
(Fig. 2a), with the risk for dasatinib and nilotinib (Fig. 2c)
in between those two. When multiplying up by the much
larger population affected for lenalidomide, the pre-MEA
population-level risk burden is around 50 times greater for
this technology than for any others examined in our studies
(£249 million population P-SUB vs. £4.9 million for the
next largest).
4 Discussion
We have presented the HTA risk analysis chart as an
approach to visualising the need for and potential value of
MEA schemes in a consistent and transparent manner,
building on standard methods already used in HTA. We
developed the concept of P-SUB to assess the risk asso-
ciated with HTA decisions. This measure enables the
simultaneous consideration of decision uncertainty and the
extent to which a technology is expected to be cost inef-
fective. MEA schemes can then be assessed using the
reduction in the P-SUB they can achieve. Three examples
based on past NICE technologies were presented.
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When decision makers are faced with highly uncertain
decisions, they may be inclined to consider recommend-
ing technologies expected to be cost ineffective (i.e. with
a positive PSB), under the condition that further research
is undertaken. For example, the Cancer Drugs Fund cur-
rently funds drugs with large remaining uncertainty and
that have plausible potential to be cost effective (and
therefore can have a positive PSB), but under the condi-
tion that further data are collected [24]. The HTA risk
analysis chart presented here provides greater trans-
parency in presenting the implications of such a
scheme through the PSB, which provides a window to
deviations from risk neutrality. Say a technology has an
ICER of £32,000 and the threshold is £30,000—this tells
us nothing about the risk taken by recommending this
technology. Our framework shows that the increase by
recommending this technology in such a setting is quan-
tified by the PSB.
The risk burden to the healthcare payer can be especially
large where the affected patient population is sizeable. It is
noteworthy that the appearance of the size of the stacked
P-SUB bars is contingent on the scale used for the y-axis
(this was particularly obvious when comparing the
lenalidomide and trabectedin studies) and that the popu-
lation value of the P-SUB should therefore be taken into
account as a means of comparing P-SUBs across different
HTAs. If well designed and used appropriately, MEA
schemes can help to improve recommendations regarding
new and existing technologies in a predictable, transparent
and rational manner. While most HTA decisions are
associated with some decision uncertainty, in our three
examples there was little or no decision uncertainty and
Fig. 2 Health technology assessment risk illustrated in three case
studies. BSC best supportive care, CML chronic myeloid leukaemia,
MDS myelodysplastic syndrome, MEA managed entry agreement,
PSB payer strategy burden, PUB payer uncertainty burden, QALY
quality-adjusted life-year
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consequently no PUB prior to the MEA because in these
cases the original list prices were high in relation to the
QALYs gained as estimated by the model and using the
respective thresholds. Financial MEA schemes are likely to
have an impact on the PUB, as shown in our case studies,
highlighting the potential value in considering MEA
schemes that have both financial and research elements.
A strength of this work is that the approach builds upon
commonly used methods in technology appraisals and is
therefore straightforward to use and understand. The P-SUB
can be calculated directly and simply from a standard PSA,
using value of information and expected net benefit analysis,
enabling the analysis to be used routinely. Provided the PSA
appropriately reflects uncertainty, then the resultant MEA
analysis will also do so. However, if a model is believed by a
committee to make implausible assumptions, or where
important comparators are absent from the analysis, then the
results derived by naı¨vely applying the HTA risk analysis
chart framework would be misleading. In such cases, addi-
tional work is necessary to address the ‘structural uncer-
tainty’ in the decision model and this is of course an area of
active ongoing research [25–28]. For our framework to be of
use in the context of substantial structural uncertainty, it is
necessary to develop a PSA output that reflects that uncer-
tainty. For example, in a context where two different options
exist for a particular form or assumption (e.g. a survival
curve functional form), then one approach would be to
produce a set of PSA runs for each structure and form a
judgement about the weighting of each set (perhaps based on
statistical or expert considerations about plausibility), to
generate a single PSA reflecting the structural uncertainty, a
process called model averaging [27]. To the knowledge of
the authors, this approach has not yet been used frequently
within NICE decision making.
We wish to caution the reader from using our approach as
a standalone method to assess the need for and value of
MEAs. This paper is best viewed in the context of existing
work on categorising MEA schemes [3, 4] and that
describes the conditions under which research schemes may
be of value [4, 5, 9, 12]. Claxton et al. [12] developed key
principles and associated criteria that might guide ‘only in
research’ and ‘approval with research’ recommendations.
Garrison et al. [3] set out good practices in the assessment of
desirability, design, implementation and evaluation of per-
formance-based risk-sharing arrangements (PBRSAs). The
authors provided definitions of different PBRSAs and a
taxonomy of these, described their uses in different settings
and jurisdictions and drew several conclusions, among them
that research schemes should be assessed for their value of
research and their quality and that ex post evaluations of any
schemes should be set out at their design stage. Walker et al.
[4] described a framework within which different coverage
with evidence development decision options can be
evaluated. The authors highlighted the importance of the
technology’s value, its associated value of research, the
anticipated effect of coverage on further research as well as
the costs of reversing, and the decision-makers ability to
reverse, the decision. McKenna et al. [9] developed a
checklist of assessment of different ‘coverage with evi-
dence development’ schemes and applied it in case studies.
The authors concluded that cost effectiveness is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for a technology’s recommen-
dation for reimbursement. Rothery et al. [5] extended these
research efforts to characterise the uncertainty and value of
research issues specific to medical devices. When research
schemes are considered, practical aspects such as the tim-
ing, the reversibility of the decision and ethical issues that
may prevent research from being conducted once the
technology is widely available become relevant. We have
not provided a detailed review of guiding principles for the
use of such schemes, as this can be found elsewhere. Further
research should focus on the quantification of risk over the
decision relevance horizon. It is also important to note that
research schemes are only ever worthwhile if the decision
maker is prepared to amend, including potentially reverse, a
decision should the new evidence show that a funded
technology is not, after all, cost effective. Such stopping
rules need to be laid out at the design stage of MEAs [3].
The use and analysis of MEAs considers decision making as
a series of related decisions rather than a one-shot choice.
These research efforts are particularly relevant in the
currently changing environment in which a greater pro-
portion of HTA submissions will be for technologies that
have an immature evidence base, a trend that could lead to
payers asking for more research in many situations,
regardless of whether this is indicated or not. Routine
consideration of the P-SUB, together with other decision
algorithms that aid the assessment of when a research-
based MEA scheme is indicated and, in fact, permissible,
can aid the appropriate use of research-based schemes and
thus prevent resources from being allocated to research
projects that do not aid decision making. Further consid-
eration is currently given to how the different frameworks
could be integrated and implemented in the most efficient
way. For example, manufacturers could be required to
provide EVPI analysis (as is already the case in the Dutch
HTA system [29]) and EVPPI analysis, with the rationale
being that these analyses require only very little additional
calculation; the design and valuation of research studies
could be performed by a specialist group. We strongly
advocate for further research into a comprehensive
framework that unifies considerations about the assessment
of the need for MEAs, the prerequisites for the use of
MEAs, the design of suitable MEAs and the value of these
MEAs using these existing algorithms as well as quanti-
tative assessments.
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Although our examples are based in the UK and with
NICE technology appraisals, the framework is generalis-
able to any jurisdiction in which cost effectiveness (not
necessarily QALY based) and uncertainty analysis are
amongst the criteria for reimbursement decisions. To
facilitate the adoption of this framework by reimbursement
decision makers, further consideration would have to be
given to jurisdiction-specific requirements, such as
requirements for specific types of analysis (e.g. budget-
impact analyses are required in some jurisdictions).
5 Conclusions
Decision makers are, rightly, often more cautious about
claims made for new technologies. Rather than reject them,
there may be circumstances where their introduction into
practice can be warranted, provided the risk of doing so is
transferred to those making the positive claims rather than
public health systems. Our approach, the HTA risk analysis
chart, helps decision makers identify those situations by
presenting a standardised visualisation to show the need for
and potential value of different classes of MEA schemes.
Its use in HTA could ensure that MEAs are considered
routinely, consistently and transparently, and it should
prove particularly useful to both payers and manufacturers
in the currently changing pharmaceutical environment.
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